University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2022

Negligence at the Breach: Information Fiduciaries and the Duty to
Care for Data
Daniel M. Filler
David M. Haendler
Jordan L. Fischer

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review
Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Filler, Daniel M.; Haendler, David M.; and Fischer, Jordan L., "Negligence at the Breach: Information
Fiduciaries and the Duty to Care for Data" (2022). Connecticut Law Review. 512.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/512

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 54

MARCH 2022

NUMBER 1

Article
Negligence at the Breach: Information Fiduciaries and
the Duty to Care for Data
DANIEL M. FILLER, DAVID M. HAENDLER & JORDAN L. FISCHER
Personal data is a cost of admission for much of modern life. Employers, tech
companies, advertisers, information brokers, and others collect huge quantities of
data about us all. Yet outside of a few highly-regulated industries, American
companies face few legal restrictions on how they manage and use that data. Until
now, individuals have had very limited remedies when their data is stolen from data
collectors. But change is afoot. In a significant recent decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court took a consequential step holding that entities collecting personal
data owe a duty of reasonable care to protect data subjects against harm.
This tort decision left a critical question unresolved. What is “harm” in the
context of privacy? What is it exactly that data collectors must protect data subjects
against? This Article takes one state’s doctrinal move as a jumping-off point to
consider a question of immense national importance—how to apply common law
negligence principles in cases involving the disclosure and misuse of personal data,
and specifically, what a “duty to care” means in the unsettled realm of privacy law.
Building off Jack Balkin’s work, this Article proposes that fiduciary law offers an
appealing framework for conceptualizing privacy harms and the corresponding
responsibilities of the entities who are collecting our data. In doing so, it begins the
conversation of how tort law can take a central place in protecting individuals when
data holders betray their trust.
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Negligence at the Breach: Information Fiduciaries and
the Duty to Care for Data
DANIEL M. FILLER, * DAVID M. HAENDLER ** & JORDAN L. FISCHER ***
INTRODUCTION
Personal data is the price of admission to much of the Internet. Many
leading service providers accept personal data as a substitute for cash
payment. Facebook, Twitter, and Google rarely charge their “subscribers” a
monthly tariff, but the choice to use these services comes at the cost of data.
When individuals are uncomfortable sharing personal data with content
providers or media companies—for example, if they are unwilling to risk a
data spill—they can choose to cut the cord. However, in many cases,
individuals must surrender personal data in exchange for the basics of
survival. For example, what if you want a job?
Consider the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). UPMC
is the largest private employer in Pennsylvania with approximately $23
billion in revenue.1 It is a sprawling health care provider and insurer
touching almost every corner of the state, with a growing international
division.2 Like pretty much every other employer in America, it collects data
on its employees. It is required to do so to comply with tax, benefits, and
employment laws, as well as for a variety of other practical reasons. You
cannot get a job at UPMC, or frankly anywhere, without surrendering
personal data. Unless you are independently wealthy, you cannot cut the
cord on employment.
Thus, every employee puts herself at risk simply by choosing to work.
UPMC employees learned that lesson in 2014. That spring, UPMC
announced that cyber-criminals had infiltrated its computer systems,
compromising the data of up to 62,000 individuals and exposing hundreds

*
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1
UPMC Facts and Stats, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH MED. CTR., https://upmc.com/about/facts/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2021).
2
UPMC Fast Facts, UNIV . OF PITTSBURGH MED . CTR., https://www.upmc.com/-/media/upmc/
about/facts/documents/fast-facts.pdf?la=en&hash=020D1C5749D88500376CA9A0302F06B8F058AE
FC (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
**
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of employees to possible tax fraud. Such data breaches have become
commonplace, as over 9,000 data breaches have been reported since 2005.4
Victims of data breaches—and plaintiffs’ litigators—have noticed, and they
have turned to the courts for help, catalyzing the growth of a burgeoning
new field of tort litigation.5 More than fifty percent of the respondents in a
2019 survey of Fortune 1000 legal decisionmakers believed that data privacy
and security issues represent “the next wave of class action[]” litigation, up
from less than thirty percent in 2017.6
It was not inevitable that victims would turn to tort law as a solution to the
data spill mess. Legislatures could have acted aggressively to address these
issues, foreclosing the need for—or actively precluding the use of—tort
litigation. They have not. While legislatures have made some limited efforts
to address these issues, existing legislative initiatives have left major gaps in
addressing the mass collection of data. At the same time, the judicial system
has struggled to make sense of the role of tort law. Two questions have vexed
many courts. First, in the absence of legislative action, is there a common law
duty of care for data? For example, did UPMC have a duty to protect the trove
of private employee data that it collected? Second, even if there is a duty, how
can a court make sense of the concept of harm when this the duty is breached?
What exactly did those UPMC employees lose?
Litigation has a way of forcing these questions, and it appears change is
afoot. In the aftermath of the UPMC data breach, employees sued for relief
under a common law negligence theory. Victims of the UPMC data breach
argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should expand the notion of
duty between the employer and the employee.7 In a landmark decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court obliged, holding that when an employer
collects and stores employee data on its computers, it takes on “a duty to

3
Second Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, Dittman v. UPMC, No. GD-14-003285 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. June 25, 2014); see also Erica Teichert, UPMC’s Estimate of Data Breach Victims
Skyrockets to 27k, LAW360: EMP. AUTH. (Apr. 18, 2014, 7:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment
-authority/articles/529625/upmc-s-estimate-of-data-breach-victims-skyrockets-to-27k (discussing the
extent of the data breach).
4
Data Breaches, PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches (click
“Download the Database”) (last visited Aug. 18, 2021).
5
See Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data
Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 74 (2014) (analyzing “court dockets for more than
230 federal data breach lawsuits from 2000 to 2010”). The most common causes of action in federal data
breach lawsuits between 2000 and 2010 were unfair business practices, Fair Credit Reporting Act
violations, breaches of contract, negligence, and Privacy Act violation claims. Id. at 101.
6
CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN REDUCING
COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 13 (2019), https://classactionsurvey.com/pdf/
2019-class-action-survey.pdf.
7
See Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1046 (Pa. 2018) (“[W]e agree with Employees that this
case is one involving application of an existing duty to a novel factual scenario . . . .”).
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exercise reasonable care to protect [employees] against an unreasonable risk
of harm arising out of that act.”8
This decision, in Dittman v. UPMC, breaks new ground in its concrete
application of duty to those collecting data. Indeed, defense attorneys have
described the decision as a “landmark in state litigation” that could open
“floodgates.”9 But, while it may spur a new wave of tort litigation, the story
does not end there. This decision, and the broader doctrinal shifts that will
likely follow, forces courts to begin addressing the second question. What
exactly constitutes the “harm” that data collectors are obliged to protect data
subjects against? Furthermore, what are the boundaries of those obligations to
protect data? The concept of a duty to protect another is incoherent without a
concept of what we are obliged to protect that person from. As the comments
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts note, “[Duty in tort] is merely a means
whereby the interest protected by the duty can be made secure.”10
What precise interest was compromised during the UPMC data breach?
Privacy interests are notoriously difficult to define or articulate.11 Judges and
scholars have produced many competing models of what privacy is, why
people do or do not value it, and how privacy interests might be harmed.12
Lacking a firm conception of what privacy is, how people benefit from
privacy, and how people are harmed by privacy violations, courts have
struggled in applying tort law to the unpredictable, fast-moving, and
all-pervasive world of electronic data collection, with many cases foundering
on the issue of whether a legally cognizable injury has occurred.13 The U.S.
8

Id. at 1047.
See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. See also infra note 16.
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965).
11
See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039,
1041 (2018) (“[D]espite the importance of information privacy in modern society, privacy harms are
hard to pin down. This, in turn, creates challenges for information privacy law, since a clear conception
of these harms is essential for determining both standing and remedies.”); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries
of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011) (“What is a privacy harm? What makes it distinct from
a burn or some other harm? We are often at a loss to say.”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002) (“Time and again philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have
lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy.”); Judith Jarvis Thomson,
The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS . 295, 295 (1975) (“Perhaps the most striking thing about the
right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.”).
12
See, e.g., Cofone & Robertson, supra note 11, at 1044–47 (discussing competing models of
privacy); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920–21
(2005) (“[T]he American courts lack a coherent, consistent methodology for determining whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular fact that has been shared with one or
more persons. Indeed, jurisdictions cannot agree on a framework for resolving these kinds of cases.”);
Solove, supra note 11, at 1092 (arguing that the recurrent ideas in privacy discourse can be categorized
“under six general headings”). Relatedly, the concept of what constitutes “public” information is also
confused and contradictory. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV.
459, 459 (2019) (discussing incoherence in the definition of “public” information).
13
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739 (2018) (“The concept of harm stemming from a data breach has
9
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Supreme Court’s metaphor that only “concrete” injuries can support Article
III standing14 maps awkwardly, at best, to the evolving digital-era injuries
caused by the transmission of electronic information.15
The question of how to define privacy harm has perplexed American
jurists for more than one hundred years. That question has become
increasingly urgent in the face of the exponential growth of tort litigation
over data spills. Now, with Dittman establishing that employers (and likely
other data collectors) have a common law duty to protect others from these
ill-defined harms, the dam has broken. There will be growing pressure for
other states to follow the lead of the Dittman Court, expanding the reach of
the common law duty of care. But courts, lawyers, and the public need
guidance on how to fill this significant conceptual gap, particularly as
litigants seek to apply the case to new fact patterns emerging in the
ever-changing information economy.16 This is therefore a critical moment to
confounded the lower courts. There has been no consistent or coherent judicial approach to data-breach
harms.”); Margot E. Kaminski, Standing After Snowden: Lessons on Privacy Harm from National
Security Surveillance Litigation, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 414 (2017) (“Standing to sue is one of the
larger problems for both data breach and data privacy litigation. . . . Lower courts struggle with standing
in data breach and data privacy cases, and have produced varied results.”); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel
J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2277 (2015)
(“Contract law and tort law have not often been successfully applied to many of the issues involving the
collection, storage, use, and disclosure of personal data—when courts have applied contract and tort
theories to these issues, they have struggled significantly in the application. More broadly, the law has
struggled to recognize privacy violations and data security breaches as harms.”).
14
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1545 (2016) (discussing harms that qualify for Article III injury-in-fact requirement).
15
See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 654 n.1 (2019) (“The Court's
metaphor of concreteness to describe a matter sufficiently weighty to afford the attention of federal courts
is hardly helpful for digital harms.”); Kaminski, supra note 13, at 418–20 (discussing how the Supreme
Court’s decision in Spokeo has “given lower courts more fodder for dismissing privacy claims” and given
rise to a “general sense of judicial skepticism over privacy injury”); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm
Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361 (2014) (“[H]arm presents an especially acute challenge
in the context of privacy. Courts generally demand that privacy plaintiffs show not just harm, but
concrete, fundamental, or ‘special’ harm before they can recover.”)
16
See, e.g., Matt Fair, Pa. Ruling May Open Floodgates on Cybersecurity Suits, LAW360 (Nov. 27,
2018, 8:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105174 (“In the wake of the [Dittman] ruling, Duane
Morris LLP partner Sandra Jeskie told Law360 that plaintiffs’ attorneys were likely not only to start
bringing a flurry of new cases on behalf of workers impacted by cyberattacks on their employers, but to
also try and apply the ruling to cases involving consumers and others caught up in data breaches.”); Carol
Steinour Young, Happy Thanksgiving Pennsylvania Businesses and Employers – This Year, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Is Serving Up Increased Exposure to Liability, JD SUPRA (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/happy-thanksgiving-pennsylvania-87391/ (“[I]t is likely that the
Court’s reasoning will be extended to other contexts where one party collects and stores another’s
information, such as the business-consumer context or the university-student context.”); Edward
McAndrew, Kristen Poetzel & Philip Yannella, PA Supreme Court: Businesses Have Duty to Safeguard
Sensitive Employee Information, JD SUPRA (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/pasupreme-court-businesses-have-duty-14177/ (“Because the court’s recognition of a legal duty to protect
data is tied to the very act of collecting and storing such data, this new legal principle is unlikely to be
limited to the employment context.”); Gary Schober, Pennsylvania High Court Holds Employers Have
an Affirmative Duty to Protect Employees’ Personal Data, JD SUPRA (Nov. 29, 2018),
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consider a question of national significance—how to apply common law
negligence principles in cases involving the disclosure and misuse of
personal data. Courts around the country are likely to face the puzzle that
Dittman did not solve.
We propose that a solution may lie in the conception of the “information
fiduciary” developed by legal theorist Jack M. Balkin. In his article
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, Balkin sets out a
framework for privacy duties based on the relationships between data
collectors and data subjects, analogizing to common law information
security duties owed by fiduciaries such as doctors, lawyers, and
accountants.17 In this formulation, a privacy violation, like a breach of
fiduciary duty, is a violation of trust—trust that the information provided to
another would not be misused.18
Fiduciary law has traditionally worked to enable trust in relationships
characterized by imbalances of power, knowledge, and control, protecting
principals from exploitation and providing them with legal mechanisms to
enforce the confidence that they place in their fiduciaries.19 With some
adaptations, we believe that it can fulfill a similar role in the modern
information economy. Although we depart from Balkin’s analysis in certain
respects, the fiduciary law’s emphasis on relationships provides a useful
model for understanding privacy harms in the context of common law
negligence claims regarding personal data.
In Section I of this Article, we describe the general landscape of data
security and privacy law in the United States and the legal system’s failure
to develop a coherent theory of privacy harms. Section II discusses the
Dittman litigation, including the case’s place within the broader
jurisprudence of data breach litigation. Section III outlines Balkin’s
information fiduciary model, providing a framework to address the
fundamental gap that the Dittman duty of care model left open. Section IV
responds to some potential objections to our theory. We follow these
discussions with a conclusion.

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/pennsylvania-high-court-holds-employers-79345/ (“There should
be no doubt that all holders of personal information will ultimately be required to implement reasonable
security measures to protect personal information.”); White & Williams LLP, Five Quick Thoughts on
Dittman, JD SUPRA (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/five-quick-thoughts-ondittman-85038 (“Dittman likely extends beyond the employment context.”).
17
Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183,
1205–09 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, First Amendment].
18
See id. at 1208 (“Relationships of trust and confidence are often centrally concerned with the
collection, analysis, use, and disclosure of information. . . . So, in general, the duties of a fiduciary include
duties not to use information obtained in the course of the relationship in ways that harm or undermine
the principal . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
19
See id. at 1216–17 (discussing why fiduciary law assumes that fiduciaries and principals do not
stand on equal footing).
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I. U.S. DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW
An overview of the current approach to privacy within the United States
requires an exploration of both statutory protections and common law
jurisprudence. Because of the patchworked, disjointed approach to privacy
protections within statutory law, courts have turned to state tort law to fill
the doctrinal gaps in privacy protections. Exploring each, in turn, will
demonstrate that Dittman provided a novel solution to a growing challenge
in technology and the law.
A. Statutory Data Protections
Both the federal government and the states have enacted some statutory
provisions regarding data privacy, but these laws are fragmented and offer
little meaningful protection to data subjects. In particular, they provide very
limited recourse for individuals who suffer from data breaches.
1. Statutory Federal Protections
Currently, there is no all-inclusive U.S. federal data privacy law.
However, there are some federal statutory protections, as well as some
limited administrative guidance, for data within certain industries and for
certain entities collecting data.20 Those federal privacy protections generally
fall into two categories: (1) industry-specific regulations, and (2) agency
authority to direct certain privacy requirements.21
First, certain federal industry-specific regulations impact private sector
collection of personal information. Generally, the industries that are required
to take proactive measures in protecting information include healthcare,
finance, childcare, and education.22 While these statutory privacy protections
do provide some mechanism to hold data collectors accountable for the data
within their control, the government often has sole authority to enforce
accountability for those privacy protections, and recourse for individuals is
20
The U.S. government itself operates under the Privacy Act of 1974 when it collects and processes
data from U.S. citizens. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Enforced by the Office of Management and Budget, the Privacy
Act requires that the U.S. government and its agencies provide transparency in data collection and
incorporate privacy principles of purpose limitation and data minimization. Id. However, the Privacy Act
only applies to data collection by the federal government, not by private entities. Id.
21
While the Fourth Amendment does provide certain privacy protections at the federal level—specifically,
privacy protections from the federal government—it is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on privacy
requirements of private-sector entities.
22
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (providing privacy
standards aimed at financial institutions); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (providing privacy standards aimed at health records);
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 226 (2009) (requiring notification of data breaches by entities covered under HIPAA); Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (providing privacy
standards aimed at educational records); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-730 (providing privacy standards aimed at children’s online activity).
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often limited.
For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) Breach Notification Rule requires covered entities (i.e.,
hospitals, medical institutions, etc.) to provide notice of any breach of the
security or privacy of Protected Health Information, but it does not provide
a cause of action for individuals to seek redress where covered entities have
disclosed their personal data and thereby exposed them to harm or the risk
of harm.23 Instead, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is charged with
enforcing HIPAA and taking any action under the law.24
Second, certain federal agencies possess authority to direct privacy
protections within the private sector. These agencies include the OCR, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), among others.25 One of the most prominent
agencies in the enforcement of privacy protections within private industry is
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The FTC has derived federal privacy and security protections in
commercial sectors from section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”26 The FTC has therefore claimed authority to ensure that
companies live up to their promises related to data security and privacy.
However, the FTC’s approach to ensuring the enforcement of data security
and privacy practices is subject to criticism. First, through the use of
enforcement actions against individual companies, the FTC is creating “a
‘patchwork’ of data security standards” and “businesses do not have fair
notice of how the FTC will apply the standards to their own practices.”27
Second, the FTC’s authority is limited to companies’ practices that are
deemed unfair or deceptive.28 As such, the FTC is often left to making
discrete decisions about security and privacy practices, not necessarily

23

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2021).
Id.
25
See generally Compliant Portal Assistant, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: OFF. FOR C.R.,
https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/smartscreen/main.jsf (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (providing portal for
reporting violations of privacy or security of health information under HIPAA); Privacy Act Information,
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/managing-director/privacy-transparency/privacy-actinformation (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (providing information on how the FCC collects, uses, shares,
and protects personal information); Privacy Impact Assessments, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/oit/privacy-impact-assessments (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (providing information
on SEC privacy impact assessments).
26
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). The FTC’s authority in this area was recognized and upheld by the Third
Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). See also Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 650–56
(2014) (discussing the FTC’s use of settlement agreement to establish best practices for privacy policies).
27
Robert S. Turchick, Is the FTC Playing Fair? The Third Circuit’s Decision in FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp. Furthers Agency’s Data Security Efforts but Creates Tension for Smaller Businesses,
61 VILL. L. REV. 71, 73 (2016).
28
Id. at 72 n.10.
24
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mandating global security and privacy standards across a wide variety of
business functions.
Thus, while federal law provides data protection mandates for federal
government agency and private data collectors in some sectors, its coverage
is limited, and it provides little meaningful recourse for individuals who
have been harmed through data breaches.
2. State Data Protection Laws
With a lack of clear guidance at the federal level, states have stepped in
to create their own legislative privacy protections. State legislators dealing
with privacy issues have taken a number of approaches that can be
categorized as follows: (1) general privacy legislation; (2) data-specific
legislation; and (3) cyber breach legislation.
First, there is a growing focus on creating more “general” privacy
legislation that governs the collection and processing of any type of personal
information, regardless of the industry. The strongest example of this
approach in the United States to date is the California Consumer Privacy Act
of 2018 (CCPA).29 The CCPA applies to the collection and processing of
personal information of California consumers, defined as natural persons
who are California residents.30 Unlike the standard United States siloed
approach to privacy, the CCPA is industry agnostic. There is, however, a
threshold of revenue or amount of data that needs to be collected to trigger
a business’s requirement to comply with the CCPA.31 The CCPA has
changed the dialogue in the United States, with many states looking to
California as an example of how to protect privacy.32 Often, these general
privacy-oriented regulations include protections for individuals, as well as
mechanisms to bring a private right of action in the event of a violation.33
Second, in addition to these general privacy-oriented regulations, states
continue to select specific types of data to protect. Currently, biometric data
is the most heavily regulated data category.34 For example, Illinois created
one of the strongest biometric data protection laws—the Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA).35 BIPA has provided some of the most
29

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2021).
Id. § 1798.140(g).
31
Id. § 1798.130(c).
32
See, e.g., Assemb. 4640, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (proposing requirements for certain
business to notify data subjects of collection of personally identifiable information and establishing
security standards); H.R. 1049, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (proposing requirements for
all businesses to provide notice to consumers on what personal information is being collected and if it
will be sold, and granting consumers opt-out rights).
33
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (2021) (providing a private right of action for consumers
in the event of a security breach impacting their personal information).
34
See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §503.001 (2021) (regulating the use of biometric identifiers);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2021) (regulating the same).
35
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1, /5, /10, /15, /20 /25, /99 (2021).
30
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proactive protections in the collection and use of biometric data, with
numerous court cases developing these protections.36 Under BIPA,
“biometric information” is defined as “any information, regardless of how it
is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric
identifier used to identify an individual.”37 Any private entity, regardless of
size, that collects biometric information is required to take proactive
measures to protect that information, including maintaining a written policy
available to the public, notifying individuals prior to any collection of
biometric information, and respecting restrictions on the transfer or sale of
any biometric information.38 While BIPA only impacts one category of
information, it aligns with influential frameworks like the Fair Information
Practice Principles39 in providing key requirements such as notice,
transparency, purpose limitation, and data minimization.
States historically have provided protections retroactively after the
unauthorized access or inadvertent misuse of personally identifiable
information. Currently, all fifty states maintain data breach notification laws,
each with some unique nuances and requirements.40 Generally, these data
breach notification laws are triggered when certain combinations of
unencrypted data are unlawfully accessed or exfiltrated. The combination
creating personally identifiable information typically includes an
individual’s full name plus financial information, driver’s license, or other
similar document.41

36

See, e.g., Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1199–200 (Ill. 2019) (allowing
an action to continue under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act without showing an actual
injury; violation of the act alone is sufficient).
37
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2021).
38
Id. at 14/15.
39
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS xxiii–xxxv (1973), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf.
40
Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT ’ L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx.
41
See, e.g., Breach of Personal Information Notification Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2302 (2021)
(specifying that for purposes of data breach notification act, “personal information” constitutes a first or
last name linked with an unencrypted Social Security number, driver’s license number, or financial
account number and password). Following the Equifax breach in 2017, states have begun to broaden their
definitions of “personally identifiable information,” recognizing that identifying information, beyond
even financial information, can harm the individual. For example, in Delaware, the personally
identifiable information triggering a data breach notification requirement was expanded to include (1) a
username or email address in combination with a password or security question and answer that would
permit access to an online account, and (2) unique biometric data generated from measurements or analyses
of human body characteristics for authentication purposes. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 12B-101(7) (2021).
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The majority of these data breach notification regulations do not include
an express private right of action for individuals.42 Instead, these laws
usually only require data collectors to alert data subjects when a third party
has stolen their information, limiting any remedy solely to notice, with little
or no monetary compensation.
B. Common Law Privacy Protections
Within this gap of legislative protections for privacy, and particularly
with the limited recourse for individual victims, litigants and courts have
looked to tort law to fill the gap. The common law offers two leading
approaches to protecting privacy—first, the privacy torts, and, second, the
law of negligence. However, tort law has not been an effective approach due
to the conceptual limitations of the privacy torts and the difficulty of
defining privacy harm in the negligence context.
In the United States, the privacy torts are often conceptualized as
protecting a “right to be let alone,” an idea that can be traced back to Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s groundbreaking 1890 article, The Right
to Privacy.43 Over subsequent decades, state common law evolved in the
direction advocated by Warren and Brandeis, culminating in the work of the
legal scholar William Prosser, who analyzed the development of privacy tort
law and identified four discrete privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion;
(2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation.44
Yet, even before 1890, a number of Anglo-American legal doctrines
developed to protect the distinct-but-related concept of confidentiality in
contexts including evidentiary privileges, fiduciary law, government
records, postal law, and telegraphy.45 Privacy—as defined by Warren,
Brandeis, and Prosser—is an individualistic concept based on the right to
shield certain types of information from others; confidentiality is a relational
concept based on the right to selectively disclose sensitive information
without fear that it will be disseminated beyond the boundaries contemplated
by the discloser-confidant relationship.46 The implications of the two
42
PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
TERRITORIES 128 (2018), https://privacyrights.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Data%20Breach%20Notifi
cation%20in%20the%20United%20States%20and%20Territories.pdf.
43
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890);
see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE
94–96 (2018) [hereinafter WALDMAN, INFORMATION PRIVACY] (describing the development and
adoption of the Warren-Brandeis-Prosser approach to privacy).
44
WALDMAN, INFORMATION PRIVACY , supra note 43, at 94–96; see also Neil M. Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO . L.J. 123,
148–56 (2007) (discussing the historical development of the privacy torts).
45
See Richards & Solove, supra note 44, at 134–44 (discussing the law of confidential
relationships).
46
See id. at 173–75 (“In contrast to Warren and Brandeis’s individualistic conception of privacy,
the English law of confidentiality focuses on relationships rather than individuals. Far from a right to be
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doctrines are strikingly different—voluntary disclosure of information to
any third person may waive a privacy interest, but not necessarily a
confidentiality interest.47
Because the privacy torts are focused on protecting information that has
never been voluntarily disclosed, whereas, in Richard A. Posner’s words,
“one cannot negotiate modernity without continuously revealing personal
information to a variety of demanders,”48 scholars have criticized the privacy
torts as poorly suited to modern concerns and the growing data economy.49
Existing privacy torts heavily rely on a user’s expectation of privacy, that is,
the concept that a user should intend for a facet of their life to remain private.
The challenge under this framework is the increasingly blurred lines
between private and public, especially as surveillance technology creeps
further into our daily lives. This reliance on an individual user’s expectation
of privacy gives rise to a “privacy paradox,” through which Lindsey Barrett
succinctly concludes that “an individual’s behavior that is less
privacy-protective than their expressed preferences reveals a true preference
against privacy in favor of other values, such as convenience, efficiency, or
economic gain.”50 Courts are unable to truly discern a baseline level of
privacy to protect when they rely on the perceived expectations of
individuals who are required to use data-collecting technologies in order to
engage with modern society.
With the privacy torts conceptually incapable of dealing with modern
privacy concerns, negligence is currently the predominant theory under
which data breach class action plaintiffs seek recovery. 51 In 2017, sixty-five
percent of all federal data breach class actions alleged negligence as their
primary theory of liability, and ninety-five percent of such complaints
included it as a cause of action.52 Yet, if courts cannot conceptualize privacy
harms, then the law of negligence will also fail to protect data subjects from
the misuse or exposure of their information. Courts are currently split on
let alone, confidentiality focuses on the norms of trust within relationships. Indeed, most of our personal
information is known by other people, such as doctors, spouses, children, and friends, as well as institutions,
such as ISPs, banks, merchants, insurance companies, phone companies, and other businesses.”).
47
See id. at 174–75 (“In applying the American privacy torts, many courts find that information is
not private because it is shared with others or exposed in some way to the public. . . . Confidentiality
stands directly at odds with the notion that when people share information with others they necessarily
assume the risk of betrayal. The very purpose of confidentiality law is to recognize and enforce
expectations of trust.”) (footnote omitted).
48
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 249 (2008).
49
See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50
Lindsey Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law & Governance, 35
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 13 (2018).
51
DAVID ZETOONY, JENA VALDETERO, TAMARA KOURY & STEPHANIE DRUMM, 2017 DATA
BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 6 (2017), https://www.bclplaw.com/images/content/9/6/v2/96690/BryanCave-Data-Breach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf.
52
Id.
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whether digital breaches can create a sufficiently concrete harm to find that
a plaintiff has standing to bring a case.
The cyber breach context is illustrative in demonstrating the challenge
in articulating the concept of harm. Often, following a cyber breach, unless
there is immediate use of personal information to cause harm to the
individual, the idea of future harm is amorphous. Courts are split on whether
future harm is sufficient to demonstrate a viable cause of action. The First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have held that plaintiffs must allege more
than the fact that their information was stolen to show an Article III injury.53
In contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that allegations
of future harm are sufficient when plaintiffs allege that their data has been
stolen and is in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals.54 However, without an
express statutory right to bring a lawsuit, individuals are finding it hard, if
not impossible, in the current legal frameworks, to demonstrate harm
sufficient to hold private actors accountable for misuse or negligent handling
of personal information under tort theories of liability.
The articulation of harm directly impacts the finding of a duty by
collectors of data. Courts have weighed in on this concept, but a
comprehensive approach still remains elusive. For example, in Sackin v.
TransPerfect Global, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York addressed a breach of an employer’s information systems
resulting in the exposure of employee information.55 The court found that
the employees had stated a viable negligence claim against their employer
because “employers have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect the
[personally identifiable information] that they require from employees.”56
Further, in In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California addressed the existence of a duty in the consumer context.57
53
See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that theft of
credit card information, risk of future identity fraud, and time and money expended in resolving
attempted fraudulent charges did not constitute injury sufficient for standing purposes); see also, e.g.,
Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that increased future risk of identify fraud
did not constitute injury sufficient for standing purposes); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st
Cir. 2012) (holding the same); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding the
same).
54
See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff’s
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, are sufficient
to establish a cognizable Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation.”); Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that standing existed because “[a]t this
stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from
the Neiman Marcus data breach”); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding standing where “Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm
stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data”).
55
278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
56
Id.
57
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
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There, the court found a legal duty existed within the contract between the
two parties that was “well supported by both common sense and California
and Massachusetts law.”58 However, the court rejected a finding of a
common law duty, explaining that “Plaintiffs have failed to allege a ‘special
relationship’ with Sony beyond those envisioned in everyday consumer
transactions, and therefore, negligence is the wrong legal theory on which to
pursue recovery for Plaintiffs’ economic losses.”59
In Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools, the Illinois Appellate Court
declined to recognize a common law duty under Illinois law because the
Illinois data breach notification statute did not provide for statutory
liability.60 The plaintiffs attempted to draw a duty sufficient to support their
negligence claim from existing statutory law.61 However, because those
statutes only provided for notice as a remedy for a breach of personal
information, the court rejected any claim that a duty to safeguard personal
information existed,62 highlighting the challenge of using tort theories to fill
gaps in statutory protections.
As an additional example, in Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that no common law duty to
safeguard private information existed in the plaintiffs’ relationship with a
health insurer.63 The court held that all of the duties alleged by the plaintiffs
were asserted under a contract between the parties, and no independent tort
duty outside of that contract existed between the parties, barring the
plaintiffs’ tort claims.64
These cases articulate the challenge and divergence in current case law
in providing a workable framework to address liability in the collection and
processing of personal data.
II. NEGLIGENCE LAW INTO THE BREACH
With both state and federal statutory law offering fragmented, limited
protections for data subjects, and the privacy torts being largely
non-responsive to modern privacy concerns, there is a gap in the legal
landscape leaving much of our data unprotected. This is where the Dittman
decision and its recognition of a duty to protect third-party data could come
into play. As the first state supreme court decision to squarely recognize a

58

Id.
Id. at 969.
60
943 N.E.2d 23, 28–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2019).
64
Id. at 18.
59
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tort duty to protect personal data,65 commentators have described Dittman
as a “landmark in state litigation over data breaches”;66 as a decision that
“drastically changed the data breach litigation landscape”;67 as “[o]pen[ing]
[the] floodgates” to employee and consumer privacy lawsuits;68 and as a
precedent which “all employers should be cognizant of when developing
their data security strategy.”69 This Section explores Dittman and its
reasoning in depth, particularly exploring its undeveloped theory of harm,
which may provide both redress for victims of data breaches and an avenue
for litigation based on data practices well beyond the cybersecurity failures
that are now so familiar to litigants and courts.70
A. Data Collection: Subject to a Common Law Duty of Care
Dittman was a purported class action lawsuit brought on behalf of UPMC
employees regarding a data breach alleged to have compromised the personal
and financial information of more than 62,000 people, including their names,
addresses, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth.71 Plaintiffs brought
claims for negligence and breach of contract.72 They alleged that UPMC failed
to take reasonable and appropriate measures to safeguard the personal data
that it required them to provide as a condition of employment, thereby causing
the employees to incur damages relating to fraudulently filed tax returns and
placing them at an increased risk of identity theft.73
The trial court granted UPMC’s motion to dismiss in May 2015.74 The
65
The Georgia Supreme Court has also held that data collectors have a duty of care with regard to
personal data. See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 837 S.E.2d 310, 316 (Ga. 2019) (holding that
allegations that personal data was stolen on a mass scale by a criminal, who offered it for sale to other
criminals and created risk of identity theft, were sufficient to allege a cognizable injury). See also In re
Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 498 (Me. 2010) (holding that, in the
absence of physical harm, economic loss, or identity theft, data theft did not constitute a cognizable harm).
66
Alexander R. Bilus & Patrick Hromisin, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Recognizes Employers’
Duty to Safeguard Employees’ Personal Data, SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.saul.com/publications/alerts/pennsylvania-supreme-court-recognizes-employers%E2%80
%99-duty-safeguard-employees%E2%80%99-personal-data.
67
Philip N. Yannella, PA Supreme Court: Businesses Have Duty to Safeguard Sensitive Employee
Information, BALLARD SPAHR (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.ballardspahr.com/insights/alerts-andarticles/2018/11/pa-supreme-court-businesses-have-duty-to-safeguard-sensitive-employee-info.
68
Fair, supra note 16.
69
Pennsylvania High Court Holds Employers Have an Affirmative Duty to Protect Employees’
Personal Data, HODGSON RUSS LLP (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.hodgsonruss.com/newsroompublications-10710.html.
70
See generally Romanosky et al., supra note 5 (analyzing “court dockets for more than 230 federal
data breach lawsuits from 2000 to 2010”).
71
Dittman v. UPMC, No. GD-14-003285, 2015 WL 13779479, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 28,
2015), aff’d, 154 A.3d 318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), vacated, 196 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2018).
72
Id. at *1, *5.
73
Id.
74
Id. at *6.
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trial court held that plaintiffs’ negligence claim was barred by the economic
loss doctrine, which it interpreted as providing that “no cause of action exists
for negligence that results solely in economic losses” without physical harm
or destruction of property.75 The court also declined to recognize a
negligence cause of action.76 In a split opinion, a three-judge panel of the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania likewise held that UPMC did not owe a duty
of reasonable care in its collection and storage of employee data and that,
even if a duty did exist, the economic loss doctrine would bar plaintiffs’
claims.77 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.78 Unlike the
lower courts, which approached the case through the doctrinal rubric used
when Pennsylvania courts consider the creation of a new cause of action,79
the Supreme Court considered the case as fitting into a traditional negligence
framework—the application of an already-existing duty of care to a novel
set of facts, rather than the creation of an entirely new duty.80 Applying the
negligence principle that a person assumes a duty of care where their
affirmative actions have created a risk of harm, the Court held that the act of
collecting and storing employee data on a computer system gives rise to a
duty on the part of the data collector, requiring the exercise of reasonable
care to protect the data subjects against an unreasonable risk of harm arising
out of its actions.81
Regarding the economic loss doctrine, the Court held that, where a duty
arises independently of any contractual duties between the parties, the
economic loss doctrine will not bar a tort action.82 As such, the Court further
held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred because UPMC’s duty to
safeguard its employees’ data existed independently of any contractual
relationship between them.83
Dittman is by no means the only court decision examining the issue of
whether a duty of care to protect personal data exists. Some courts have
found, like Dittman, that a duty to provide reasonable data security exists
under tort law, rooted in principles such as the foreseeability of harm and
the need to exercise reasonable care when engaging in affirmative conduct.84
75

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4–5.
77
Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 322–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
78
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018).
79
Dittman, 2015 WL 13779479, at *3-4; Dittman, 154 A.3d at 322–23.
80
Dittman, 196 A.3d at 1046.
81
Id. at 1046–48.
82
Id. at 1054 (“[I]f the duty arises under a contract between the parties, a tort action will not lie
from a breach of that duty. However, if the duty arises independently of any contractual duties between
the parties, then a breach of that duty may support a tort action.”).
83
Id. at 1056.
84
See, e.g., Sackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating
that “employers have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect the [personally identifiable
information] that they require from employees”); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec.
76
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On the other hand, some courts have held that there is no duty in tort to care
for personal data.85 Those courts have often stressed the importance of the
relationship between the data custodian and the data subject in determining
whether a duty of care exists.86 However, to our knowledge, Dittman is the
first decision by a state supreme court expressly holding that data collectors
have a duty of care to protect data subjects from harm. Therefore, the
decision presents a useful opportunity for all jurisdictions considering this
issue to evaluate the pros, cons, and complexities of a duty to care for data.
B. The New Challenge: What Is the Harm Data Collectors Must Take Care
to Protect?
Although Dittman held that data collectors must take reasonable steps
to protect data subjects against harm, the court did not explore the question
of what constitutes “harm” in the data privacy context. Perhaps because
some of the Dittman plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered tax fraud as a
result of the data breach,87 unlike other data breach plaintiffs alleging only
Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (“Although neither party provided the Court
with case law to support or reject the existence of a legal duty to safeguard a consumer’s confidential
information entrusted to a commercial entity, the Court finds the legal duty well supported by both
common sense and California and Massachusetts law.”); Witriol v. LexisNexis Grp., No. C05-02392
MJJ, 2006 WL 4725713, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged
that the custodian of the plaintiff’s personal information owed a duty of care to prevent access by
unauthorized third parties); In re Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:14-md2583-TWT, 2016 WL 2897520, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016) (holding that a duty to safeguard
information existed based on the foreseeability of harm); Daly v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 782 N.Y.S.2d 530,
535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“[T]his court is convinced that Met Life had a duty to protect the confidential
personal information provided by the plaintiffs. When Ms. Daly wished to purchase a life insurance
policy from Met Life, she was required to, and agreed to, supply Met Life with highly sensitive personal
information . . . . Implicit in this agreement was a covenant to safeguard this information.”).
85
See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that the
plaintiffs’ relationship with the health insurer did not give rise to either a common law duty to safeguard
private information or a fiduciary duty, such that negligence and breach of the duty of confidentiality
were not avenues on which the plaintiffs could recover for a data breach); Cooney v. Chi. Pub. Schs.,
943 N.E.2d 23, 28–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (declining to recognize a common law duty under Illinois law
where the state data breach notification statute did not provide for liability).
86
See, e.g., Attias, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (examining the relationship between insurers and insureds
to determine if a duty of data care exists); Top Trade v. Grocery Outlet, No. 2:17-cv-08467-SVW-MRW,
2018 WL 6038297, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2018) (finding a duty of care based on the foreseeability
of harm and the plaintiff-defendant relationship); Veridian Credit Union v. Eddie Bauer, LLC, 295 F.
Supp. 3d 1140, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (holding that “[b]ecause Eddie Bauer can only be held liable
for its alleged omissions or nonfeasance in the context of a ‘special relationship,’ . . . the court concludes
that Eddie Bauer does not owe a duty to Veridian based on common law principles of negligence”).
87
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1038-39 (Pa. 2018) (“Employees further alleged that the
stolen data, which consisted of information UPMC required Employees to provide as a condition of their
employment, was used to file fraudulent tax returns on behalf of the victimized Employees, resulting in
actual damages.”). See also Second Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, Dittman v. UPMC, No.
GD-14-003285 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 25, 2014) (alleging that as a result of UPMC’s failure to protect
data, “the personal and financial information of Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed Classes was
used, inter alia, to file fraudulent tax returns”).
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88

heightened risk, the court did not see a need to delve into the difficult,
philosophically challenging inquiry of what distinguishes a data-driven
harm from business as usual in the twenty-first century, thus leaving the
matter open for further litigation. This judicial modesty is wholly consistent
with the philosophy that courts should limit their holdings to the facts of the
cases before them, such that the common law will evolve to fit new social
circumstances through its gradual application to newly emerging facts.89 Yet
it also means that any court attempting to apply Dittman’s negligence
framework in the field of data privacy will face as-yet-unresolved questions
and challenges about what “harm” really means.
For example, in the realm of social media, it seems plain that collecting
and storing the personal data of millions (or billions) of users on a networked
computer system would be considered “affirmative conduct,” thus giving
rise to risks under Dittman, and that social media companies owe their users
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against unreasonable risks
of harm arising out of that conduct.90 But what does it mean for Facebook to
protect its users from an unreasonable risk of harm arising from its collection
of data? At a baseline level, the existence of a duty of care mandates that
Facebook must take reasonable measures to prevent cyber-criminals from
stealing data.91 This is straightforward enough, aside from the ever-shifting
question of what constitutes reasonable cybersecurity.92 More interesting
88

See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing a federal circuit
split over whether a plaintiff may establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of
identity theft, and holding that plaintiffs’ allegations “of an enhanced risk of future identity theft” were
too speculative to support standing).
89
See Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc., 984 A.2d 478, 490 (Pa. 2009) (“For very good
reasons, our decisional law generally develops incrementally, within the confines of the circumstances
of cases as they come before the Court. For one thing, it is very difficult for courts to determine the range
of factual circumstances to which a particular rule should apply in light of the often myriad
possibilities.”); Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 599 (Pa. 2012) (“Like any
other cause of action at common law, negligence evolves through either directly applicable decisional
law or by analogy, meaning that a defendant is not categorically exempt from liability simply because
appellate decisional law has not specifically addressed a theory of liability in a particular context.”); see
also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) (describing the law of standing as
being built on separation-of-power principles that prevent the judicial branch from usurping the powers
of the political branches).
90
See Dittman, 196 A.3d at 1047 (“Thus, we agree with Employees that, in collecting and storing
Employees’ data on its computer systems, UPMC owed Employees a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm arising out of that act.”).
91
See id. at 1048 (holding that UPMC possessed a duty to protect its employees’ personal and
financial information from breach by criminal third parties).
92
See generally William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1139
(2019) (discussing fourteen frameworks for data security); Scott J. Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia,
Brenton Martell & Amanda N. Craig, Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the
Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and
International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 311–26 (2015) (reviewing existing U.S.
law shaping a cybersecurity duty of care); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 26, at 650–56 (discussing the
FTC’s data security jurisprudence).
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problems emerge when we consider negligence fact patterns emerging
principally from Facebook’s own actions, rather than from the criminal acts
of third parties, involving financial, emotional, and dignitary injuries distinct
from the risk of identity theft. Were Facebook’s users harmed when the
company’s failure to control third-party app developers allowed Cambridge
Analytica to gather information about them—including details on their user
identities, friend networks, likes, and possibly even private messages—for
use in an election-influence campaign?93 Were users harmed when Facebook
stored millions of Instagram passwords in a readable format, giving staff
unfettered access to accounts?94 Is a user harmed if Facebook alerts her
family to her pregnancy by targeting her with baby-themed advertising,95 or
if it ruins the surprise of a marriage proposal by publicly revealing that a
user recently purchased a diamond ring?96 Is a user harmed if he is fired from
his job after malfunctioning privacy settings show his employer offensive
postings that he only meant to share with a small group of friends?97 These
are difficult legal questions, and we cannot answer them without a coherent
theory of privacy harm.
Data brokers also affirmatively gather vast quantities of information
about individuals, thereby potentially taking on a duty of care under the
93
See Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants
Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html (discussing the Cambridge Analytica dataharvesting scandal); Issie Lapowsky, Cambridge Analytica Could Have Also Accessed Private Facebook
Messages, WIRED (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analyticaprivate-facebook-messages/ (reporting that Facebook security gaps allowed an app to read private
messages between 1,500 Facebook users and their contacts).
94
See Zak Doffman, U.S. Authorities Target Zuckerberg as Facebook ‘Buries’ Huge Instagram
Password Breach, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2019, 2:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019
/04/19/u-s-authorities-target-zuckerberg-as-instagram-security-breach-hits-millions/#2a2370ac5062
(discussing an instance in which millions of Instagram passwords were internally stored in a readable
format); Keeping Passwords Secure, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/
keeping-passwords-secure./ (Apr. 18, 2019, 10:00 AM) (discussing the same).
95
See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp (reporting
on companies’ usage of data analytics to profile consumers); Cotton Delo, Does Facebook Know You’re
Pregnant?; What It Knows Depends on Whom You Ask: Social Network Says One Thing, Its Advertisers
Another, ADVERT. AGE (Sept. 10, 2012), https://adage.com/article/digital/facebook-pregnant/237073
(reporting the same); see also Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your
Data?: A New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. REGUL. 667, 686 (2017) (“Marketers
will pay $0.11 to know that a woman is pregnant and in her second trimester.”).
96
See 5 Data Breaches: From Embarrassing to Deadly, CNN MONEY , https://money.cnn.com/
galleries/2010/technology/1012/gallery.5_data_breaches/3.html (Dec. 14, 2010, 1:03 PM) (discussing
data breach incidents, including an incident in which a Facebook user found that the details of his
engagement ring purchase were publicly posted).
97
See Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Bug Changed Privacy Settings of Up to 14 Million Users, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/technology/facebook-privacy-bug.html
(discussing incident in which as many as fourteen million Facebook users who thought they were creating
private posts were, in fact, making public posts that anyone could view).
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98

doctrine developed in Dittman. Data brokers collect billions of data
elements covering nearly every U.S. consumer, obtaining information from
businesses, government records, and other publicly available sources,99
largely without consumers’ knowledge.100 They also derive inferences from
the collected data (for example, inferring that an individual who recently
applied for a mortgage may be interested in furniture sales and home repair
products), then resell this data for marketing products, risk mitigation
products, and people search products, including analytic products designed
to predict consumer preferences.101 Data brokers may or may not offer
consumers the ability to access the information about them or to correct
errors in their databases.102 The FTC has found that, although consumers
benefit from many data brokerage activities, data brokerage also poses risks,
such as the risk of being forbidden services on account of opaque algorithms
or consumer segmenting.103 If a person is denied an affordable loan because
a data broker’s algorithms have characterized him as a credit risk due to false
information or racial bias, should that be considered a harm implicating a
duty of care?104 What about if a people search company helps a domestic
abuser find and kill his ex-wife? 105
Many industries affirmatively collect information that could
conceivably implicate a duty of care. Brick-and-mortar retail firms use big
data analytics in each step of their businesses;106 Walmart alone processes
2.5 petabytes of data every hour from over 200 internal and external

98
See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014) (discussing results of an FTC in-depth study of nine data brokers).
99
Some of the sources from which data brokers collect information include: (1) U.S. Census
records; (2) the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File; (3) U.S. Postal Service records; (4)
criminal records; (5) court and bankruptcy filings; (6) professional licensure databases; (7) real property
and assessor records; (8) voter registration information; (9) motor vehicle and driving records; (10) birth,
marriage, divorce, and death records; (11) blogs and social media; (12) retail websites; (13) financial
services companies; (14) marketing surveys; (15) telephone companies; and (16) other data brokers. Id.
at 11–14.
100
Id. at iv.
101
Id. at ii–iii.
102
Id. at iii.
103
Id. at v.
104
See id. at 48 (noting risks that consumers may be denied services as a result of data brokerage).
105
See id. at 48–49 (noting risks that data brokerage may enable harassment, stalking, and other harms).
106
Bernard Marr, Big Data: A Game Changer in the Retail Sector, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2015, 1:34
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/11/10/big-data-a-game-changer-in-the-retail-sector/
#758d957b9f37; see also Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1331 (2015) (“In recent years, firms have invested hundreds of millions of
dollars to build information technologies that enable them to collect and mine data from billions of
transactions—online and offline, loyalty card and otherwise. . . . They film consumers’ in-store
movements and install cameras that track the movement of consumers’ eyes as they walk down the aisles.
Marketers combine these various data sources with the literature on decisionmaking to generate
hypotheses about pricing practices that are then tested in stores.”) (footnotes omitted).
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107

streams. In the legal field, the two leading legal research platforms are
components of sprawling data brokerage conglomerates that, amongst other
things, sell surveillance data to Immigrations and Customs Enforcement,
raising ethical concerns about whether attorneys are entrusting sensitive
information to entities hostile to their clients’ interests.108 Even companies
that sell beds,109 children’s toys,110 and household appliances111 now surveil
their users, such that, “[t]he regulatory challenge of the early twenty-first
century is the toaster that betrays you.”112
The surveillance economy113 offers an almost limitless number of fact
patterns in which data subjects might be injured, degraded, or aggrieved
without data breaches or identity theft.114 In addition to the psychological
anxieties and self-censorship that may arise from constant monitoring,115
modern data collection practices and technologies may expose data subjects

107

Bernard Marr, Really Big Data at Walmart: Real-Time Insights From Their 40+ Petabyte Data
Cloud, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/01/23/reallybig-data-at-walmart-real-time-insights-from-their-40-petabyte-data-cloud/#7525357b6c10.
108
See generally Sarah Lamdan, When Westlaw Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal Ethics in the Era of
Big Data Policing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255 (2019) (discussing partnerships between U.S.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and legal research companies).
109
See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 235–36 (2019) (discussing the privacy implications of the
Sleep Number smart bed).
110
Donell Holloway & Lelia Green, The Internet of Toys, COMMC’N RSCH. & PRAC. 506, 506–07
(2016) (“The emerging risks of Internet-connected toys to children and families include corporate and
government surveillance of children’s activities and encroachments upon their data privacy and security . . . .
Other risks include hacked surveillance of Internet-connected toys, geo-locational tracking of children and
remote control of toys’ various recording and ‘speaking’ technologies by others.”); Kate Fazzini, Toys and
Apps Often Track Your Kids and Collect Information About Them—Here’s How to Keep Them Safe, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/23/connected-toys-privacy-risks.html (Nov. 26, 2018, 11:29 AM).
111
See David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 493, 500–01 (2016) (discussing privacy implications of products and technologies like the Amazon
Echo, Apple’s Siri, and others).
112
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1169 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin,
Algorithmic Society].
113
See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 109 (discussing the role of surveillance and data monetization
in the modern economy).
114
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2006)
[hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy] (attempting to create a taxonomy of privacy harms); Rostow, supra note
95, at 671–72 (discussing privacy harms that flow from the collection, aggregation, use, and
dissemination of digital information).
115
See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 114, at 493 (“Not only can direct awareness of surveillance
make a person feel extremely uncomfortable, but it can also cause that person to alter her behavior.
Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and inhibition. Because of its inhibitory effects, surveillance is
a tool of social control, enhancing the power of social norms, which work more effectively when people
are being observed by others in the community.”).
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117

to discrimination,
consumer manipulation,
voter manipulation,118
manipulation by persons within one’s social networks,119 blackmail,120 wage
theft,121 stalking,122 and harassment.123 What does a duty to protect others from
harm mean in such an environment?
One possible answer to this problem would be to rely on the analytic
framework of the Prosserian common law privacy torts—intrusion upon
seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life,
and publicity placing a person in false light124—to determine whether an
individual has been harmed by the collection of data. This is similar to the
116
See Vladeck, supra note 111, at 513 (“The process of engaging in algorithmic decision-making is
one that is opaque and complex, and can effectively mask discrimination. . . . But regulators will have a hard
time uncovering discrimination when the decision is made by machine-learning algorithms that process
mounds of data.”) (footnotes omitted); Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations:
Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1415–16 (discussing how consumer
segmentation using brokered data may augment power imbalances by making better deals available to
consumers with greater social capital and further explaining that “scores and segmentations that factor in
race, gender, and other suspect considerations may foster discrimination”); Nate Cullerton, Behavioral
Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J. 807, 820 (2013) (“Digital profiles have profound real-world effects,
determining access to and pricing for credit, insurance, and consumer products in ways that entrench existing
disadvantages of class and race.”).
117
See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1650–51 (2017) (discussing digital market manipulation as a method for firms to
identify and exploit consumer cognitive biases); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 995, 999 (2014) (“A specific set of emerging technologies and techniques will empower
corporations to discover and exploit the limits of each individual consumer’s ability to pursue his or her own
self-interest. Firms will increasingly be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability in consumers . . . .”).
118
See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 336–37 (2014)
(discussing the potential of digital information platforms to swing election results via selective
dissemination of news).
119
See Rostow, supra note 95, at 673 (“When data brokers sell consumer data to individuals, they
allow buyers to learn about the behavior and motivations of those whose data they purchase. These
insights allow the buyers to influence the decisions of those around them, leading to potential harms
unrecognized by privacy scholarship to date.”).
120
See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Ashley Madison Users Face Threats of Blackmail and Identity
Theft, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/technology/ashley-madisonusers-face-threats-of-blackmail-and-identity-theft.html?searchResultPosition=1 (reporting on blackmail
threats against users of dating website intended to facilitate affairs); Ariana Eunjung Cha, Charlie
Sheen’s HIV Status and the Dawn of Medical-Data Blackmail, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015) (reporting
on attempt to blackmail actor Charlie Sheen for $10 million by people who threatened to reveal his HIV
test results).
121
See Joelle Gamble, The Inequalities of Workplace Surveillance, NATION (June 3, 2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/worker-surveillance-big-data/ (discussing the use of data technology
to surveil workers and alter workplace dynamics).
122
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Hundreds of Apps Can Empower Stalkers to Track Their
Victims, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/technology/phone-appsstalking.html (reporting on consumer apps that can be used to surveil domestic partners); Symposium,
The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence, INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS COMPUT. SOC’Y 441,
441 (2018) (reporting the same).
123
Valentino-DeVries, supra note 122.
124
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (AM. L. INST. 1997) (providing the
Restatement definitions of the common law privacy torts).
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approach that Facebook has advocated for in the Cambridge Analytica
multidistrict litigation, where it argued that courts should look to the
common law privacy torts to determine whether intangible privacy harms
qualify as concrete for purposes of Article III standing.125
However, as many legal scholars have argued, the common law privacy
torts are ill-equipped to recognize harms flowing from the misuse of
electronic data.126 Because the governing theory of common law privacy
torts is that privacy is a right to keep people out—based on individual rights,
rather than on social relationships127—they are not well-suited to address
problems flowing from the misuse of information which we have already
voluntarily shared or been made to share.128 Furthermore, the concepts of
private space and seclusion are central to the privacy torts and incoherent in
the realm of cyberspace.129 As Lauren Henry Scholz has written:

125
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Defendant Facebook, Inc. to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Consolidated Complaint at 10–15, In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User
Profile Litig., No. 3:18-MD-02843-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) (arguing that the court should refer to
the common law privacy torts in Article III standing analysis). But cf. Matthew S. DeLuca, Note, The
Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2439, 2466–67 (2018) (arguing that the law
of Article III standing does not restrict courts to the framework of the privacy torts).
126
See, e.g., Scholz, supra note 15, at 668 (criticizing the “cramped nature of the privacy torts”);
Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law Approach for Data
Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 621–22 (2018) (noting that the privacy torts’ “focus on the actual public
exposure and dissemination of private information is a poor analytic fit for data breaches”); WALDMAN,
INFORMATION PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 94–96 (discussing the historic development of the privacy
torts and their limitations based on the “governing theory that the right to privacy was a tool to keep
others out”); Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy From History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 973–74 (2012)
(“As many have convincingly argued, tort privacy is especially inadequate to address the needs of the
twenty-first century, when new technologies magnify privacy injuries.”); Richards & Solove, supra note
44, at 155 (“[T]he privacy torts have struggled when addressing emerging privacy problems in the
Information Age, such as the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data by businesses.”); Patricia
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007) (“The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which reflects the general state of privacy tort law in the United States,
has been a poor guide and is now outdated.”) (footnotes omitted); Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data
Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 159 (2006) (“To suggest
that the existing scheme of privacy torts would be an effective tool for addressing the complex problems
of personal information abuse is akin to suggesting that one could use a toy drill to fix a nuclear reactor.”).
127
See Richards & Solove, supra note 44, at 173–74 (discussing how conceptions of privacy in
American law “are defined in very individualistic terms,” and contrasting with confidentiality, which
“focuses on the norms of trust within relationships”)
128
Id. at 175–76 (discussing doctrinal reasons why the American privacy torts “have often struggled
when applied to the disclosure of personal data by businesses”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at
920–21 (“Despite the centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a coherent, consistent
methodology for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
particular fact that has been shared with one or more persons. Indeed, jurisdictions cannot agree on a
framework for resolving these kinds of cases.”).
129
See Abril, supra note 126, at 18–20 (discussing how the traditional privacy torts rely on privacy
as a function of location, with actions within a bedroom being entitled to greater privacy protection than
actions in the town square, but that this spatial analysis breaks down in cyberspace).
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The Prosserian approach to the worry that privacy plaintiffs
would bring too many general claims into court was to
consciously cabin the right into highly specific fact patterns. . . .
When problems are framed highly specifically, they struggle to
apply effectively to newly possible infringements created by
technosocial developments.130
In any case, from the number and scope of breaches131 and the continued
persistence of poor security practices,132 it seems fair to say that existing
legal doctrines have not effectively deterred the negligent handling of
personal information.133
Another answer to this problem might be to cabin Dittman’s definition
of “harm” such that only injuries to person or property are actionable, and
some courts considering allegations of privacy harm have done just so.134
However, this trend is at tension with other threads of the common law of
torts, which have long acknowledged that violations of privacy interests,
relational interests, interests in self-determination, and other intangible
interests may, in some instances, form the basis for a tort action, even if such
violations do not result in physical or pecuniary injuries.135 For example,
under the common law tort of invasion of privacy, damages are awarded to
compensate the plaintiff for harm to dignity, and a victim may be entitled to
general damages, special damages, punitive damages, and injunctive
130
Scholz, supra note 15, at 668 (footnotes omitted); see also Richards & Solove, supra note 44, at
148–56 (discussing Prosser’s influence in limiting the scope of privacy law).
131
See Data Breaches, PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches
(last visited Aug. 13, 2021) (providing a database of publicly-reported data breaches).
132
See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine
in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 981 (2016) (“Much of the economic literature
suggests that the persistent incidence of large scale data breaches demonstrates that network externalities
or other market failures have led to an underinvestment in security.”); Jacob W. Schneider, Note,
Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 299 (2009) (“A prominent security company has claimed that [seventyseven percent] of its clients are insecure when consultation begins and as many as [seventy-five percent]
of all online retailers are vulnerable.”) (footnotes omitted).
133
Opderbeck, supra note 132, at 983; Schneider, supra note 132, at 282.
134
See, e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 304 (2012) (holding, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, that the Privacy Act of 1974 does not authorize damages for emotional distress);
Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at *8 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016)
(“Courts have held that loss of privacy and breach of confidentiality are too abstract to establish Article
III standing.”); Khan v. Child.’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) (citing In re
Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 962 n.5 (D. Nev. 2015)
(holding that the loss of privacy arising from a data breach was not a “concrete and particularized injury”
and therefore did not give rise to damages).
135
See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140–58 (1992) (discussing the
evolution of tort law to compensate for harms other than direct and tangible injuries to persons or
property, including harms to privacy, emotions, relational interests, and self-determination interests, as
well as lost chances and increased risks); Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 756–74 (discussing judicial
recognition of claims for damages based on risk and anxiety).
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136

relief. Similarly, in a suit regarding the publication of private information,
damages include harm to the plaintiff’s privacy interests, mental distress of
a kind normally resulting from an invasion, and special damages caused by
the invasion.137 Even if the common law privacy torts do not represent a
viable framework for resolving modern data injuries,138 the fact that the law
has historically recognized claims for redress based on factors other than
out-of-pocket consequential damages139 suggests that restricting the modern
definition of data-driven “harm” to solely pocketbook injuries would
represent an ahistorical breach with the past, as well as a judicial abdication
of the traditional responsibility to protect individuals from the affirmative
acts of others.140
III. INFORMATION FIDUCIARY THEORY AS A RUBRIC FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE DUTY OF CARE
This Article proposes that the information fiduciary concept developed
by Jack M. Balkin141 and expounded on by other scholars142 can fill
136
See 5 Damages in Tort Actions § 44.02 (2019) (Matthew Bender) (discussing elements of
invasion of privacy claims).
137
Id. § 44.03.
138
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of common law privacy torts).
139
See Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 771 (“In case after case involving the privacy torts and
breach-of-confidentiality tort, courts have recognized harm based on pure emotional distress or
psychological impairment. Fear, anxiety, embarrassment, and loss of trust are all recognized as harms.
Humiliation, nervousness, worry, and loss of sleep are understood as compensable harms.”) (footnotes
omitted).
140
For a discussion of damages, see infra Section III.C.
141
See, e.g., Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1185–87 (discussing the information
fiduciary concept); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2048 (2012)
[hereinafter Balkin, Triangle] (arguing that companies “that create and maintain . . . relations of digital
dependence and vulnerability should be considered information fiduciaries toward their end users.”)
(emphasis in original); Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 112, at 1160–62 (discussing the
information fiduciary concept). Professor Kenneth Laudon appears to have coined the phrase in the early
1990s. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, in ICIS 1993 Proceedings 65, 70–71 (1993).
142
See, e.g., Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User
Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 10–12 (2018) (proposing four main principles of (1) antimanipulation, (2) antidiscrimination, (3) limited sharing with third parties, and (4) compliance with
privacy policies as touchstones for determining user expectations for information fiduciaries); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 665 n.20 (2018) [hereinafter Waldman,
Designing] (“Many scholars, including Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, Dan Solove, Danielle Citron, and
others, have recommended a shift toward a fiduciary or trustee model to ensure corporations take
consumer privacy seriously.”); Solow-Niederman, supra note 126, at 625 (arguing that holders of
consumer data in commercial transactions should be considered “data confidants” with a duty to securely
maintain the information); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 457–58 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously]
(arguing that the information fiduciary concept can help rejuvenate privacy law and policy by introducing
notions of trust); Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1941, 1943–44 (2016) (discussing implications of information fiduciary theory for free speech
jurisprudence); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies
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Dittman’s gap by creating a theory of privacy harm based on a framework
of “privacy as trust,” rather than “privacy as secrecy,” in which courts
determine whether data practices should be considered “harms” principally
by looking to the relationships between data collectors and data subjects and
the expectations of the parties.
A. Information Fiduciary Theory
Information fiduciary theory is a conception of privacy rights centered
on the idea that certain kinds of information represent matters of private
concern that the government may regulate consistent with the First
Amendment based, not upon their content, but upon the social relationships
that produce them.143 The law has long recognized that professionals, such
as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, have a duty to exercise appropriate
care with information related to their clients, as such professionals occupy a
special relationship of trust and confidence with their clients.144 Balkin
argues that the digital age “has given rise to new fiduciary relationships
created by the explosion of the collection and use of personal data” and that
the law should recognize such relationships “for the same reason that the law
recognized older forms of fiduciary duties in the past.”145 Due to the
difficulties that principals face in monitoring fiduciaries and the potential for
fiduciaries to dominate or exploit their principals, the common law has
traditionally imposed a duty of confidentiality, requiring fiduciaries to keep
their principals’ information secure,146 and a duty of loyalty, requiring
fiduciaries to act in good faith and put their principals’ interests ahead of
their own.147 Balkin argues that companies collecting digital information
Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information
-fiduciary/502346/ (proposing a “grand bargain” in which tech companies that agree to user-protective
standards and practices would be exempted from compliance with a range of state and local laws); Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 649–50 (2015) (arguing
that the information fiduciary concept can be used to reform Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that no
longer reflects modern privacy concerns); Zittrain, supra note 118, at 339–40 (discussing information
fiduciary theory as a potential solution to “digital gerrymandering” in which firms use control over
consumer information to influence elections); Danielle Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries,
CONCURRING OPS. (June 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/8DV4-TUXQ (discussing the potential of
information fiduciary theory to regulate data brokers).
143
See Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1209–20 (discussing how fiduciary law
framework has allowed courts to limit speech by professionals such as lawyers or doctors without
violating the First Amendment).
144
See id. at 1205–07 (discussing fiduciary duties traditionally owed by professionals); see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 477 (2017) (providing guidance on securing the
communication of protected client information); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 483
(2018) (providing guidance on lawyers’ obligations after an electronic data breach or cyberattack).
145
Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1221.
146
See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 20–22 (2011) (discussing the duty of security).
147
See id. at 106–07 (discussing the duty of loyalty); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (discussing the same).
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should owe similar duties to their end users: a duty of care and
confidentiality, meaning that companies must keep end users’ data
confidential and secure, and a duty of loyalty, meaning that companies must
not betray end users’ trust or otherwise manipulate them.148 Together with
Jonathan Zittrain, Balkin has proposed a Digital Millennium Privacy Act,
offering digital media companies a “grand bargain” wherein the federal
government would provide a safe harbor preempting state privacy
regulations for companies that agree to a set of information practices along
these lines.149
Fiduciary law provides a model for the legal governance of power
relationships that can be adapted to diverse circumstances.150
Anglo-American courts have applied the fiduciary framework in areas of
law including agency, bankruptcy, charities and nonprofits, corporations,
employment, family relationships, guardianship, health, investment
banking, legal representation, partnerships, pensions, and trusts.151
According to Evan J. Criddle, “[c]ourts have eschewed formalistic criteria
for identifying fiduciary relations and instead reason by analogy to
paradigmatic relations such as trust, partnership, and agency.”152
Furthermore, although fiduciary duties are often referred to in moralizing
tones as duties of “the finest loyalty. . . . stricter than the morals of the market
place,”153 the law recognizes limited or quasi-fiduciary duties in instances
where one party has greater access to information and/or the opportunity to
dominate another, but the relationship between the parties is not such where
a full fiduciary obligation, including the duty to put the principal’s interests
above those of the fiduciary, would be warranted.154 Some examples of
148

Balkin, Triangle, supra note 141, at 2051–53.
See Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 142 (“The DMPA would provide a predictable level of federal
immunity for those companies willing to subscribe to the duties of an information fiduciary and accept a
corresponding process to redress privacy and security violations. . . . [T]hose who accept the deal would
gain the consistency and calculability of a single set of nationwide rules.”).
150
See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA. L. REV. 117, 125
(2006) [hereinafter Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations] (discussing the historical genesis and development
of the fiduciary concept); DeMott, supra note 147, at 880–81 (“The term ‘fiduciary’ itself was adopted
to apply to situations falling short of ‘trusts,’ but in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like
a trustee. . . . The evolution of fiduciary obligation thus owed much to the situation-specificity and
flexibility that were Equity’s hallmarks.”) (footnotes omitted).
151
See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV.
993, 994 n.1 (2017) [hereinafter Criddle, Liberty] (providing examples of different areas of the law in
which fiduciary duties arise).
152
Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 150, at 125; see also FRANKEL, supra note 146, at
2 (“One reason for the paucity of a general definition of fiduciary relationships may be the many
situations and contexts in which these relationships appear. That could make the courts’ generalization
difficult or even impossible.”).
153
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
154
See Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. CORP. L. 343, 374–76
(2011) (listing quasi-fiduciary duties often recognized by common law or statute).
149
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quasi-fiduciary duties include a majority shareholder’s quasi-fiduciary duty
to minority shareholders,155 a carrier’s quasi-fiduciary duty to shippers,156
and a trusted employee’s quasi-fiduciary duty not to reveal trade secrets.157
One of the main goals of information fiduciary theory is to shift the focus
of privacy debates from arguments about regulating information to protect
privacy interests to arguments about regulating relationships to protect
privacy interests.158 Another virtue of information fiduciary theory is that it
draws upon a mature area of law that has traditionally been used to safeguard
vulnerable parties in relationships that are characterized by imbalances of
knowledge and power.159 Scholars have widely applauded Balkin’s work as
an innovative and appealing approach to modern privacy problems,160
attracting interest from lawmakers of both parties at the federal level,161 with
a group of Democratic senators having introduced legislation to impose
duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality on online service providers.162
One of the drawbacks of information fiduciary theory is that it is difficult
to adopt a legal framework largely, but not entirely, designed to govern
professional services into the strikingly different realm of electronic data
collection, even though they both implicate core concerns of power,

155
See Ferber v. Am. Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983) (recognizing a quasi-fiduciary
duty owed by majority shareholders).
156
See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (recognizing a quasifiduciary duty owed by carriers).
157
See Safeway Transp., Inc. v. W. Chambers Transp., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (recognizing a quasi-fiduciary duty owed with respect to trade secrets); see also Prentice, supra
note 154, at 374–76 (listing quasi-fiduciary duties often recognized by common law or statute).
158
See Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1187 (“My goal, in other words, is to shift the
focus of First Amendment arguments about privacy from the kinds of information to the kinds of
relationships—relationships of trust and confidence—that governments may regulate in the interests of
privacy.”); see also, e.g., WALDMAN, INFORMATION PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 40 (arguing that the
central goal of privacy is to “maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people,” not to
keep information hidden from all others).
159
See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 117, at 1689 (arguing that one of the advantages of
information fiduciary theory is that “it imports a relatively mature area of law” in an area that “is premised
upon information and power asymmetries”).
160
See, e.g., Dobkin, supra note 142, at 7 (“Conceiving of service providers as ‘information
fiduciaries’ may be the way to balance freedom of speech with data privacy, while still allowing service
providers to grow and innovate.”); Rostow, supra note 95, at 705 (praising Balkin’s proposal as
protecting consumers from digital abuse while still “accommodating a digital environment that places
highly sensitive information in the hands of a diverse array of commercial entities”); Calo & Rosenblat,
supra note 117, at 1688–89 (discussing the advantages of the information fiduciary approach); Richards
& Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 142, at 458 (“We agree with Balkin and Solove that the
concept of fiduciaries helpfully reorients privacy and crystallizes the concept of trust in information
relationships.”). But see generally Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information
Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019) (criticizing information fiduciary theory on various grounds).
161
See Khan & Pozen, supra note 160, at 500 (discussing legislative proposals inspired by
information fiduciary theory).
162
Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
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163

vulnerability, and trust.
Balkin himself acknowledges that consumer
expectations of many modern data collectors are very different from
consumer expectations of professionals and other traditional fiduciaries,
such that standards that are appropriate to protect doctor-patient
relationships are not necessarily appropriate to protect employer-employee,
store-customer, or Facebook-user relationships.164
For example, some of the leading data collectors, including Facebook
and Google, have adopted the business model of offering digital services in
exchange for personal data, rather than for cash payments— thereby evoking
the frequently-repeated mantra, “If you are not paying for the product, you
are the product.”165 Consequently, adopting a lawyerly standard of fiduciary
loyalty that flatly prohibits fiduciaries from profiting on the personal
information of their clients would wreak havoc on the economic foundations
of the Internet.166 Lina Khan and David Pozen suggest that imposing a duty
of loyalty for data collection will lead to an insurmountable conflict in which
data collectors will be torn between loyalty to shareholders and loyalty to
data subjects.167 Other scholars have criticized the information fiduciary
framework as being too limited in scope to offer meaningful protection since
so many major data collectors cannot be considered to be in relationships of
trust with data subjects,168 and courts have resisted the application of
fiduciary responsibilities to data custodians.169

163

See Balkin, Triangle, supra note 141, at 2049 (discussing differences between the business
models of tech companies and traditional fiduciaries like doctors and lawyers).
164
See id. (“[W]e should expect that [tech companies] will not have all of the same obligations as
doctors and lawyers.”); Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1225–26 (“Fiduciary duties or duties
of confidentiality for doctors and lawyers are often quite broad and strong; they may be greater than we
would reasonably expect of online service providers and related digital enterprises.”)
165
See generally Will Oremus, Are You Really the Product?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/are-you-really-facebooks-product-the-history-of-a-dangerousidea.html (discussing the genesis and history of the “you are the product” aphorism).
166
Balkin, First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1227.
167
See Khan & Pozen, supra note 160, at 508–10 (arguing that it may be impractical for corporate
boards and executives to manage cross-cutting fiduciary obligations to data subjects and shareholders).
168
See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 95, at 699 (criticizing the information fiduciary framework as not
being designed to protect data subjects from indirect abuses from persons other than the companies that
initially collect their data); Bambauer, supra note 142, at 1950–51 (arguing that Balkin’s formulation of
an information fiduciary is too narrow to contain Amazon, Netflix, and most other web services).
169
See, e.g., Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 818 (7th Cir. 2018)
(finding no fiduciary relationship between a grocery store and banks issuing payment cards); Attias v.
CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding no fiduciary relationship between data
subjects and a health insurer); Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 774 (W.D.N.Y.
2017) (finding no fiduciary relationship between data subjects and a health insurer); In re Premera Blue
Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1202–03 (D. Or. 2016) (finding no
fiduciary relationship between data subjects and a health insurer); Anderson v. Hannaford Bros., 659
F.3d 151, 157–58 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding no fiduciary relationship between grocery customers and a
store regarding payment card data).
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However, as Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards have written,
[T]he law need not face the binary choice of treating
information relationships as either “fiduciary” or “unprotected.”
Surely some middle ground exists between these two extremes.
Accordingly, we recommend that duties inspired by fiduciary
law can apply in a flexible and variable way across the full
spectrum of information relationships.170
We agree. Like Hartzog and Richards, we propose that courts can
employ fiduciary concepts to define the common law duties owed by data
collectors without imposing “the highest duty implied by law”171 upon them
or requiring them to act “with the utmost good faith in furthering and
advancing” 172 data subjects’ interests.
B. Using Information Fiduciary Theory to Fill the Conceptual Gap
We return to the crucial question about the nature of “harm.” When the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that UPMC owed its employees “a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against an unreasonable risk of
harm,”173 what did the word “harm” encompass?
We propose that the affirmative act of collecting personally identifiable
data forms a relationship between the data collector and the data subject
whereby the data subject is made vulnerable to the data collector, which has
the ability to exploit asymmetries of power and knowledge inherent to the
relationship or which may allow those asymmetries to be exploited by others
by failing to secure the data.174 Thus, the affirmative act of collecting
personally identifiable data gives rise to a quasi-fiduciary relationship, such
that data subjects suffer harm if the collected data are exploited in ways that
are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties and the
intended scope of the relationship.175 Revisiting the language of Dittman, we
might say that, “in collecting and storing Employees’ data on its computer
systems, UPMC owed Employees a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
them against an unreasonable risk of harm arising out of that act.”176 The
170

See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 142, at 458 (discussing the use of
information fiduciary concepts to emphasize the importance of trust in privacy law).
171
Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 161 A.3d 811, 819 (Pa. 2017).
172
Id. at 820.
173
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1047 (Pa. 2018).
174
See Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 112, at 1157–58 (“[T]he actual practices of
collecting, analyzing, and using Big Data for governance and control involve relationships of power
between people. . . . [T]echnology is actually a way of exemplifying and constituting relationships of
power between one set of human beings and another set of human beings.”).
175
Note that the data collector has the option of severing this relationship at any time by deleting
its information about the data subject (although, of course, deletion would not cure any harms that the
data subject had already suffered from breaches or other causes).
176
Dittman, 196 A.3d at 1047.
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relationship between the parties is the locus of any prospective harm—that is,
if a person is “harmed” for Dittman purposes, it is because their expectations
of the relationship were violated. In Ariel Dobkin’s formulation, “[W]hat
separates an acceptable practice from an unacceptable one is users’
expectations: if a service provider is using data in a way that reasonable users
would not expect, the service provider may have violated its duty.”177
But how can courts determine the boundaries of these information
relationships to determine whether they have been violated? This is where
fiduciary law comes into play as a body of law that is concerned with
relationships involving inevitable asymmetries of knowledge and power,178
the transfer and safeguarding of sensitive information,179 and the need to
protect vulnerable parties from domination.180 In particular, the fiduciary
duties of confidentiality and loyalty provide helpful guidance for
conceptualizing the rights and responsibilities of persons within an
information relationship.
The duty of confidentiality means that data collectors must keep the data
that they obtain confidential and secure against unauthorized access and that
they must take reasonable precautions to ensure that anyone whom they
grant authorized access abides by the same restrictions that they do.181 This
is not a duty of absolute secrecy but, rather, a duty to maintain sensitive
information within reasonable contextual boundaries. After all, even a
professional subject to strong fiduciary duties of confidentiality, such as an
attorney, may disclose information protected by the attorney-client privilege

177
Dobkin, supra note 142, at 17; see also Balkin, Triangle, supra note 141, at 2049 (“What
constitutes a breach of trust depends on the nature of their business, and this, in turn, depends on what
consumers would reasonably consider unexpected or abusive for digital companies to do.”).
178
See Dobkin, supra note 142, at 10 (“[Fiduciary] relationships have a common dynamic: there is
an information asymmetry, so both parties know that the person with less information will trust or rely
on the person with more information. To manage this dependency, the law imposes a special duty on the
person with more information to ensure that she does not take advantage of the asymmetry.”); Balkin,
First Amendment, supra note 17, at 1227 (“[O]nline service providers present the familiar problems that
generally give rise to fiduciary obligations. First, there are significant asymmetries of knowledge and
information between online service providers and end-users. Second, it is very difficult for end-users to
verify online companies’ representations about data collection, security, use, and dissemination. Third,
it is very difficult for end-users to understand what online companies do with their data and how data
analysis and use affects their interests. Fourth, even if end-users understood these information practices,
it would be almost impossible for end-users to monitor them.”).
179
See FRANKEL, supra note 146, at 20–22 (discussing fiduciary relationships created by the
entrustment of sensitive information); Richards & Solove, supra note 44, at 173–75 (discussing the law
of fiduciaries and confidential relations).
180
See Criddle, Liberty, supra note 151, at 997 (arguing that the primary purpose of private
fiduciary law is to prevent fiduciaries from dominating their beneficiaries).
181
See Balkin, Triangle, supra note 141, at 2051–52 (arguing that under a duty of confidentiality,
social media companies would be required to ensure that anyone who shares or uses their data is equally
trustworthy and legally bound by the same requirements that they are).
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where ethical requirements demand it to prevent harm to third parties;182
where a dispute has arisen between the attorney and client;183 or with third
parties, like paralegals and expert witnesses, who are supervised by the
attorney.184 Likewise, UPMC had a duty to keep its employees’ tax
information confidential as against the public,185 but not against payroll
processors or tax authorities. Note that both of these scenarios contemplate
situations in which the data collector may disclose information to others
without the data subject’s consent, even though doing so would harm the
data subject’s material interests. For example, a client could suffer severe
penalties if their lawyer reveals that the client has perjured himself, and an
employee of UPMC might prefer to be paid under the table, rather than to
have her employer inform tax authorities about her salary. Nonetheless, we
would not say that disclosure inflicts a legally cognizable harm in either
case. This illustrates why consent and material interests are not firm
foundations to base a “harm” analysis upon.
The duty of loyalty means that data collectors must use information in a
manner that is consistent with data subjects’ reasonable expectations and their
own business models.186 They may not “act like con artists” or “induce trust
in their end users to obtain personal information from them and then turn
around and betray that trust by harming and manipulating them for the
company’s own benefit.”187 Using UPMC as an example, having collected its
employees’ information for tax and employment purposes, it would breach the
duty of loyalty for UPMC to sell that data to marketing firms, as that is
unrelated to the purpose for which UPMC solicited the data. It would not,
however, represent a breach of the duty of loyalty if Google were to sell
information about customers’ search histories to advertisers since doing so is
consistent with Google’s business model and user expectations. Firms with
attenuated relationships to data subjects, such as third-party data brokers, may
have no duty of loyalty at all; the data subjects never willingly provided their

182
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1)–(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (setting out rules
for the confidentiality of information within the client-lawyer relationship).
183
See id. r. 1.6(b)(5) (“A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and a client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . .”).
184
See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.6-7(b) (2021-2022 ed.) (discussing the relationship
between client confidentiality and paraprofessionals under the lawyer’s control).
185
See Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1047 (Pa. 2018) (concluding that the defendant owed a
duty to exercise reasonable care in collecting and storing their personal and financial information on its
computer systems).
186
See Balkin, Triangle, supra note 141, at 2053 (“The duties of information fiduciaries depend in
part on what is reasonable to expect from them given their business models.”).
187
Id.
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information to the firms, and they have no reasonable expectation that the data
will be used in a way that is consistent with their interests.
In most cases, we expect that data subjects have a baseline expectation
of data security—that anyone gathering sensitive information about them
will take reasonable precautions to prevent the data from being stolen by
criminals. Thus, in the run-of-the-mill data breach case such as Dittman,
proving that reasonable data subject expectations were violated will not be
difficult. However, plaintiffs proceeding on other theories of harm will need
to provide proof of what a reasonable person would have expected in the
context of their relationship to the data collector. Any assessment of data
subject expectations should be based on an objective, “reasonable person”
standard, not on the subjective expectations of the plaintiffs. There are two
reasons for this. First, using such a standard will prevent data collectors from
being held liable for violating expectations that are unreasonable,
idiosyncratic, or unknowable. Second, and more importantly, a standard that
looks to subjective expectations will not be amenable to class certification
and therefore will not be a realistic means for protecting data subjects’
rights.188 Some forms of evidence that have been used to show the
expectations of the hypothetical “ordinary consumer” in the product liability
context include seller representations, circumstantial evidence, industry
customs and standards, statutes and regulations, expert testimony, and
survey data.189
It is also worth noting that this would represent a duty of care, not a strict
liability standard. Consider a hypothetical employer who used reasonable
cybersecurity to protect employee data but suffered a network breach at the
hands of a particularly sophisticated intruder who used a zero-day exploit
that no existing security measures could shield against.190 Its employees
would suffer harm from the breach since the hack violated their expectation
of confidentiality. But the employer would not be liable to its employees
under a tort theory since it satisfied its duty of care. Similarly, consider a
rogue Human Resources employee who downloads names and photographs
of co-workers from a company database, then posts them on an internet
forum dedicated to mocking unattractive people. The affected employees
would be harmed insofar as their expectation of loyalty was violated, but the
188

See infra Section IV.C.
See Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047, 1061–63 (2002) (discussing
methods for proving the existence and content of consumer expectations); see also Tincher v. Omega
Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 387 (Pa. 2014) (“The nature of the product, the identity of the user, the product’s
intended use and intended user, and any express or implied representations by a manufacturer or other
seller are among considerations relevant to assessing the reasonable consumer’s expectations.”).
190
A zero-day exploit is a cyberattack that occurs on the first day that a weakness is publicly discovered
in software, before the program’s creators have had the opportunity to develop a security patch. See What Is
a Zero-Day Attack? – Definition and Explanation, KASPERSKY, https://usa.kaspersky.com/resourcecenter/definitions/zero-day-exploit (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
189

2022]

NEGLIGENCE AT THE BREACH

139

employer itself would not be liable, provided that it had satisfied its duty of
care by taking reasonable precautions to ensure that the data would only be
used for intended, employment-related purposes.191
C. Remedies
If we conceive of privacy harm as a breach of trust, what does that imply
for damages? How is a court or jury supposed to put a dollar value on, for
example, an employee’s trust that their employer will exercise due care with
their Social Security number? Again, fiduciary law can come into play to help
answer these questions. One of the reasons why fiduciary theory represents an
attractive model for assessing privacy harm is because fiduciary law’s
framework of flexible, equitable remedies can recognize injuries and offer
redress, even where the victim has not suffered an out-of-pocket loss.192
Courts have imposed a number of different remedies for breaches of fiduciary
duty, including compensatory damages, restitution, punitive damages, and
injunctive relief,193 each of which we briefly discuss below.
1. Compensatory Damages
As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[o]ne standing in a
fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm
resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation.”194 In data breach
cases where plaintiffs seek recovery from the inadvertent disclosure of
private information, awards representing the costs of identity theft, credit
monitoring, and emotional distress would likely represent the standard
measure of compensatory damages.195 But courts have generally been
skeptical of such claims in data breach litigation, holding that they are too
191
Whether the rogue HR employee might be held liable is a separate question that revolves around
whether the duty of care owed by UPMC would also run towards UPMC’s employees—an interesting
and important question beyond the scope of this Article.
192
See DeMott, supra note 147, at 888 (“The general goal of contract damages, in short, is to
compensate the plaintiff for loss of an expected advantage. The law of fiduciary obligation calculates
damages from a very different perspective. That perspective dictates that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
specific restitution of any benefit that the defendant obtained through his breach or, if specific restitution
is not feasible, money damages that quantify the defendant’s benefit. Even if the fiduciary’s actions have
not injured the beneficiary, and even if the beneficiary has in some sense gained as a result of the
fiduciary’s act, the fiduciary must account to the beneficiary for its profits.”) (footnotes omitted).
193
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. (d)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006) (discussing
remedies for breach of fiduciary duties).
194
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. L. INST. 1979). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. (e) (AM. L. INST. 2012) (“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is liable for a
loss resulting from the breach.”); In re Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Under Pennsylvania
law, a director is liable to the corporation for breaching his duty of care for ‘losses which were
proximately caused by the negligent and wasteful conduct’ at issue.”).
195
See Romanosky et al., supra note 5, at 83–84 (noting that the typical elements of damages
claimed in data breach lawsuits include actual losses from identity theft, credit monitoring costs,
emotional distress, and anticipated future losses).
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196

speculative or remote to support standing. However, at a minimum, the
Dittman approach supports the notion that claims relating to identity theft
remediation and an “increased and imminent risk” of identity theft197
constitute cognizable economic damages.198
2. Restitution
Where a fiduciary has committed a breach of duty, the principal may
elect the restitutionary remedy of forcing the fiduciary to disgorge any
profits that it accrued through the breach—thus imposing a constructive trust
to prevent unjust enrichment.199 Such disgorgement-based remedies
encourage loyalty and transparency by deterring fiduciaries from taking
advantage of their position of trust, even when they can do so without
inflicting an obvious loss upon the principal.200 Restitutionary remedy
theories are appealing in the privacy context because they directly address
the economic incentives that motivate data collectors to misuse personal
information.201 Although restitution will be inapposite in most data breach
cases since data collectors are not enriched by the actions of criminal
hackers, it will represent the most intuitive remedy in scenarios where data
collectors violate the trust of data subjects for commercial gain. It is,
however, worth noting that, in most instances, restitutionary remedies will
be fairly modest on an individual level. For example, Facebook’s worldwide
average revenue per user was $24.96 in 2018,202 and marketers can buy
access to information regarding the certain prescription drugs that an
individual takes for as little as $0.26.203
196
See Solove & Citron, supra note 13, at 749–52 (discussing judicial skepticism towards theories
of data-breach harm).
197
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1039 (Pa. 2018).
198
See id. at 1048 (characterizing the plaintiffs as claiming “purely economic damages”).
199
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“A person who obtains a benefit (a) in breach of a fiduciary duty [or] (b) in breach of an equivalent
duty imposed by a relation of trust and confidence . . . is liable in restitution to the person to whom the
duty is owed.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. c (AM. L. I NST. 2012) (“A trustee who
commits a breach of trust normally is not allowed to benefit individually from the breach, and the trustee
is subject to liability to eliminate any such benefit.”); see also Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure
of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1048 (2011) (“In the event of the fiduciary’s breach of duty,
the principal is entitled to an election among remedies that include compensatory damages to offset any
losses or to makeup any gains forgone owing to the fiduciary’s beach, or to disgorgement by the fiduciary
of any profit accruing to the fiduciary owing to the breach.”); In re Lampe, 665 F.3d at 519–20 (noting
that Pennsylvania courts often use the concept of unjust enrichment as a measure of liability for breach
of fiduciary duty).
200
Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1048–49; DeMott, supra note 147, at 888.
201
See Scholz, supra note 15, at 677–78 (“[T]he principal motivation for the law’s action here is
the wrongful profit and the incentives that it creates for businesses, not what it means for the aggrieved
party to possess what has been taken.”).
202
Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 39 (2019).
203
Rostow, supra note 95, at 686–87.
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3. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be available for especially malicious, reckless, or
oppressive breaches of fiduciary duties.204 Punitive damages could serve an
important deterrent function, especially in instances where compensatory or
restitutionary remedies are insufficient because companies have egregiously
breached their users’ trust without imposing out-of-pocket injuries on their
users or earning significant profits for themselves.
4. Injunctions
Finally, injunctive relief has traditionally been available in cases for
breach of fiduciary duty.205 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
a preliminary injunction was appropriate to prevent the potential
compromise of confidential information by a law firm206 and that, even in
the absence of an express agreement, employers are entitled to equitable
protection against the misuse of confidential information entrusted to
employees.207 Treating privacy as a matter of trust would potentially allow
courts to enjoin ongoing or imminent privacy harms.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
It is said that the mark of a good compromise is that it makes everyone
unhappy, and both privacy advocates and data industry representatives may
find faults in our conception of privacy harm. We characterize some of the
likely objections as falling into six categories—(1) scope, (2)
self-exculpation, (3) practicality, (4) ambiguity, (5) dynamism, and (6)
doctrine—and discuss each of these below.

204
See FRANKEL, supra note 146, at 258–60 (discussing punitive damages as a remedy for breach
of fiduciary duty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. d (AM . L. INST. 2012) (noting that
punitive damages for breach of trust are permitted under the laws of many jurisdictions in egregious
cases). Pennsylvania has adopted § 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding the imposition
of punitive damages, which permits punitive damages for conduct that is “outrageous because of the
defendant’s evil motives or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d
58, 69 (Pa. 1989).
205
See FRANKEL, supra note 146, at 249–51 (explaining injunctive relief as a fiduciary law remedy).
206
See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1286–87 (Pa. 1992)
(affirming grant of injunction because “the danger of revelation of the confidences of a former client is
so great that injunctive relief is warranted”); see also Mylan, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis LLP, No. 15-581,
2015 WL 12733414, at *24 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2015) (finding that a preliminary injunction was a proper
mechanism to abate a breach of fiduciary duty by a law firm).
207
See Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 203 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa. 1964) (“[W]e
have long recognized that the use of confidential material obtained by an employee from a position of
trust and confidence may not be used in later competition to the prejudice of his employer.”).
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A. Scope
Advocates for strong privacy rights might object that our
relationship-based definition of privacy harm is too narrow since it focuses
primarily upon data collectors with whom data subjects have voluntarily
shared information, excluding many other important players in the
information ecosystem.208 We have two responses to this objection. First, the
limited scope of our theory is a feature, not a bug. The mass collection and
resale of personal data by third parties gives rise to privacy risks, but it also
produces a number of social benefits, including fraud prevention and
improved product offerings.209 Legislatures and regulators are more
appropriately situated to deal with these tradeoffs than courts wielding the
blunt instrument of tort law. Furthermore, broad-based rules against the
disclosure of information that are not grounded in party relationships will be
more vulnerable to First Amendment challenges.210 Second, even data
collectors who do not have a direct relationship with data subjects would still
face a (limited) duty of confidentiality. Because all data subjects would
reasonably expect their private information to be kept secure from criminals,
regardless of whether they consented to the initial collection of that
information, our standard would require all data collectors to take reasonable
cybersecurity precautions against the unauthorized theft of personally
identifiable information—an improvement over the current fragmented state
of data breach law.211
B. Self-Exculpation
Privacy advocates might also object that data collectors could potentially
limit data subjects’ reasonable privacy expectations through the use of
disclaimers and broadly-worded privacy policies.212 A relationship-based
model of harm may fail to recognize any harms if the stronger party can
unilaterally set the terms of the relationship so as to exculpate itself from any
meaningful responsibility.213 The idea of protecting privacy through a “notice
and choice” framework is generally thought to be ineffective214 because most
208
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Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (2019) (“Notice and choice has been roundly criticized
209

2022]

NEGLIGENCE AT THE BREACH

143

215

people do not read privacy policies, privacy policies are generally difficult
to understand,216 and data subjects often have little power to decline,217
particularly in contexts such as the employer-employee relationship.
Consider, for example, an employer who creates a company privacy policy
containing a clause to the effect that, “Employer undertakes no responsibility
to protect Employees’ data against the risks of theft, misappropriation,
publication, or misuse, and Employer may use, share, publish, or sell
Employees’ data for any purposes whatsoever, including purposes not
germane to the employer-employee relationship.” Would such a clause be
effective to define a duty of care out of existence by unilaterally setting the
terms of the parties’ relationship and the employees’ expectations?
We think the answer to this question is probably no for two reasons.
While most fiduciary law rules are treated as default rules that may be
changed by agreement between the fiduciary and the beneficiary,218
fiduciary law recognizes a “mandatory core” that cannot be overridden by
agreement, including a requirement that the “principal cannot authorize the
fiduciary to act in bad faith.”219 Even where a principal has authorized
self-dealing, fiduciary law still requires the fiduciary to act in good faith and
to inform the principal of material facts.220 The existence of these mandatory
standards “insulates fiduciary obligations that the law assumes would not be
bargained away by a fully-informed, sophisticated principal.”221 When
fiduciary duties are waived, transforming fiduciary relationships into
by policymakers, academics, social scientists, advocates, and others for quite some time, and with good
reason.”) (footnotes omitted); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
74, 76 (2018) [hereinafter Waldman, Notice] (“Privacy policies are confusing, inconspicuous, and
inscrutable.”) (footnotes omitted).
215
See DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 12 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-telecommunications/
us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf (finding that ninety-one percent of
consumers accept online legal terms and conditions without reading them).
216
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1461, 1479–81 (2019) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies] (discussing phenomenon of
“unwitting consent” in which consumers fail to understand the legal agreements they are agreeing to or
the technology that mediates their relationship with the company).
217
See id. at 1486–90 (discussing phenomenon of “coerced consent” in which consumers have no
realistic option except to agree to company policies).
218
FRANKEL, supra note 146, at 195; see also Criddle, Fiduciary Foundtions, supra note 150, at
130 (noting that, while some fiduciary duties may be modified by contract, courts often treat some as
non-negotiable).
219
Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1046.
220
Id.; see also Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., concurring)
(“Whether, and to what extent, parties may contractually alter or eliminate [fiduciary] duties implicates
an extensive, ongoing debate in the legal community among segments sometimes denominated in the
commentary as contractarians and anti-contractarians. . . . Even under contractarian theory, however, in
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contractual relationships, the waiver generally must meet conditions
including full notice to the beneficiary, a finding that the beneficiary is
capable of independent will and judgment, clear and specific consent by the
beneficiary, and substantive fairness.222 Courts faced with data collectors
attempting to stretch their rights beyond that which a reasonable data subject
would agree to could draw upon these lines of precedent in refusing to
recognize such “agreements.”223
Moreover, we believe that an analysis based on relationships and data
subject expectations would view privacy policies as evidence of the parties’
expectations, but only as inconclusive evidence, worthy of consideration
insofar as they are likely to be read and understood. A 2009 study estimated
that, “if all American Internet users were to annually read the online privacy
policies word-for-word each time they visited a new site, the nation would
spend about [fifty-four] billion hours reading privacy policies,” an average
of 244 hours per year or forty minutes per day.224 Former FTC chairman Jon
Leibowitz has remarked, “We all agree that consumers don’t read privacy
policies.”225 Not even Chief Justice John Roberts reads all of the “clickwrap”
contracts that he encounters while browsing the Internet.226 Reasonable
people cannot and do not read all of the boilerplate legalese that they come
across online, much less understand it; thus, such documents cannot
represent the last word defining online relationships.227 A privacy policy that
is incomprehensible to the average person, painfully lengthy, or hidden deep
within a corporate website, therefore, represents very weak evidence of what
a reasonable user should expect. On the other hand, even boilerplate privacy
policies could provide a useful floor for defining the duty of care since a
company’s violations of its own policies would constitute strong evidence
that user expectations were violated, as well.228 Companies that wish to limit
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their Dittman liabilities would have to adopt transparent design principles,
making clear to users how their data are being used.229
C. Practicality
Privacy advocates might also argue that, as a practical matter, only
theories that are amenable to class litigation are likely to provide meaningful
protection for data subjects since, in most instances, the costs of litigation
will make it impracticable for injured data subjects to pursue individual
lawsuits. Because damages for privacy violations are likely to be low on the
individual level,230 in many cases collective litigation will be the only
practicable way to vindicate data subjects’ rights. Since modern data
collectors gather information at an enormous scale, rights that can only be
vindicated at the individual level will not offer any realistic hopes of
deterrence or redress. However, as discussed above, we believe that claims
decided under our theory would be capable of class adjudication since the
subjective privacy expectations of individual class members would be
irrelevant.231 Notably, Pennsylvania courts have held that claims for
breaches of fiduciary duty may be amenable to class treatment.232
D. Ambiguity
We have discussed some of the objections that privacy advocates may
raise in response to our theory. Alternatively, data collectors and industry
advocates might argue that a relationship-based standard of care is too
flexible and indeterminate to provide companies or the public with ex ante
notice of what the law requires, thus making it impossible for companies to
appropriately calibrate their privacy and data use policies, providing a
to dismiss where the FTC brought action alleging that a hospitality company had falsely represented that
it had implemented reasonable and appropriate data security measures).
229
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(calling for legal standards that require companies to be honest, direct, and candid regarding data
collection).
230
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231
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232
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claims regarding a limited partnership agreement involved common questions of law and fact); Parsky
v. First Union Corp., No. 771, 2001 WL 535786, at *7 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 8, 2001) (holding that
claims for breach of fiduciary duty met the commonality requirement for class certification); O’Neill v.
Sovereign Bank, No. 9708-0525, 1998 WL 1543498, at *10 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 15, 1998) (certifying
a class action based in part on breach of fiduciary duty claims). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has
held that class certification may be appropriate for fiduciary duty claims since, in such cases, there is no
need to prove reliance by class members; however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
decision on other grounds. Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 729 A.2d 574, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), rev’d
on other grounds, 761 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000).
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windfall for aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers, and raising costs for everyone.233
How can we assess when the hypothetical “reasonable user” expects a
service as novel and sprawling as Google to provide? It may be difficult or
even impossible for courts to reliably discern what constitutes objectively
reasonable data subject expectations in regard to new digital products,
particularly those with very diverse user communities.
We disagree with the notion that companies are incapable of responding
to a flexible, contextual duty of care. In the words of Justice Saylor,
concurring in Warehime v. Warehime, “[t]he complexities associated with
compliance with such loosely-defined duties are simply part of the burden
borne by one occupying a position of substantial trust.”234 Kenneth
Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan’s influential study of corporate privacy
officers in the United States and Europe found that a degree of ambiguity
“fostered evolution and dynamism” amongst corporate privacy
professionals,235 particularly where firms were required to publicly
acknowledge instances of corporate failure and multiple parties could
sanction firms for privacy breaches.236 By contrast, rule-bound governance
tends to diminish corporate reliance on internal privacy experts, thereby
reducing privacy compliance to a check-off-the-boxes exercise cordoned in
the legal department, rather than a matter of concern to executives and
designers.237 A tort regime, such as the one proposed here, may be superior
to a top-down, prescriptive regulatory regime, thus empowering privacy
professionals, focusing decision-makers’ attention to privacy concerns, and
ultimately protecting the interests of data subjects.
As for the objection that a theory based on user expectations cannot
adequately govern a field characterized by drastic technosocial revolutions,
this is another area where the theory’s limited scope would come into play.
In some cases, courts may not be able to discern what a reasonable data
subject would expect from an innovative new information services company
vis-à-vis their privacy. In such instances, where there are no reasonable
expectations of the subject-collector relationship for courts to defend, our
theory would not recognize any legally cognizable harm suffered by data
subjects or any liability incurred by data collectors. However, where courts
do find that data collectors have taken advantage of data subjects’ trust or
otherwise violated expectations of the relationship, that is an appropriate
subject for redress. The fact that hard cases may come up from time to time
233
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234
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does not justify turning a blind eye to easy cases in which data subjects’
justifiable expectations have been plainly violated.
E. Dynamism
Data collectors might also argue that adopting a relationship-based
standard of care will freeze relationships between data collectors and data
subjects in amber, discouraging dynamism, as well as freeze the development
of innovative new products and business models.238 The fact that a novel
information practice is surprising to consumers does not necessarily imply that
it is injurious to them—sometimes surprises can be pleasant.239
Our answer to this possible objection is that, while relationships between
data collectors and data subjects can change over time, when the data
collector seeks to unilaterally change the relationship, it should bear the onus
of explaining the change to data subjects and giving data subjects a
meaningful opportunity to consider whether they want to continue the
relationship on the new terms offered. Companies that forthrightly explain
their policies and implement transparent design, so as to keep the
expectations of the reasonable user aligned with their actions, will be able to
continually roll out new products and refine their existing offerings;
companies that upend user expectations without warning will face deserved
sanction. A rule that slows down Silicon Valley’s innovations to a pace that
can be understood by the people affected by those innovations will indeed
impose costs on entrepreneurs seeking to “[m]ove fast and break things,”240
but we think that those costs are socially justified and that they will even
benefit the information industry over the long term by promoting trust
between data collectors and data subjects.241 The tort law principle endorsed
in Dittman—that “anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to
others to exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an
unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act”242—means that
sometimes we must slow down, so as not to break things.
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F. Doctrine
Finally, on a doctrinal level, people may argue that fiduciary duties are
often described as contractual or quasi-contractual in nature, 243 whereas the
Dittman common law duty to care for data “exists independently from any
contractual obligations between the parties.”244 However, contract law and
fiduciary law fulfill separate functions.245 Pennsylvania law provides
separate statutes of limitation for contract and breach of fiduciary action
claims,246 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has referred to breach of
fiduciary duty actions as tort actions.247 Thus, fiduciary law can inform a
common law duty of care that is independent of contract liability, or at least
sufficiently independent of contract liability to fall within Dittman’s
conceptual space.
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CONCLUSION
Private tort litigation can play a productive role in shaping an
environment that is more attuned to the needs, concerns, and security of data
subjects (i.e., all of us), while also respecting the interests of the businesses
that collect personal information. Ari Ezra Waldman discussed how private
tort litigation encouraged automakers and drug companies to incorporate
consumer safety into car and drug design by incentivizing safety
improvements, supplementing inadequate regulatory structures, and raising
public and corporate awareness.248 A similar realignment is possible today,
but only if courts can first develop a framework of what harm and safety
mean in the data privacy context. This Article is a step toward developing
that framework and answering the questions inevitably raised by these new
developments in data tort law.
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